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This thesis represents an attempt to characterize
the bugetary process in the Venezuelan DoD. Its legal
basis are analyzed and its structural aspects are
investigated. The PP3S in the U.S.A. DoD and the
structural aspects associated with it are examined.
The concept of Organizational Development is
introduced and its association with PPB reviewed. A
simple: linear model similar to those employed by
Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky for the non-defense
appropriation process are used in analyzing
Congressional responses to Department of Defense
tudget reguests. Defense budgetary data for the Fiscal
1962-1976 time frame are empirically tested via linear
regression analysis. Results are tabulated and
discussed. Significant findings are summarized and
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"The elements of economic choice in the military
resource allocation problem, whether its solution requires
advanced mathematics, high speed computing equipment, or
just straight hard thinking, are the following:
(1) An objective or objectives. What military (or other
national) aim or aims are we trying to accomplish
with the forces, equipments, projects, or tactics
that the analysis is designed to compare ?, choice
of objectives is fundamental.
(2) Alternatives. By what alternative forces,
equipments, projects tactics and so on, may the
objective be accomplished ?, The alternatives are
frequently referred to as systems, because each
combines all the elements - men, machines, and the
tactics of their employment -needed to accomplish
the objective.
(3) Costs or resources used. Each alternative method of
accomplishing the objective, or in ether words each
system, involves the incurring of certain costs or
the using up of certain resources.
(4) A model or models. Models are abstract
representations of reality which help us to
perceive significant relations in the real world,
to manipulate them, and thereby predict others.
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(5) A criterion. By "criterion" we mean the test by
which we choose one alternative cr system rather
than another". [ Ref. 1, pag. 118
]
Within this quote lies a structure for choice as eld as
the ancient Greeks, namely the steps of the scientific
method: (1) what is the objective, (2) what are the
alternatives, (3) measurements to compare the alternatives,
(4) thinking structures to abstract the problem and, (5) a
decision based on a criterion. This method is a structure
which can be a basis for organizational control by the
budgeting system.
In everyday speech, the words "budget" and "budgeting"
carry largely negative connotations, evoking images of
unwelcome financial constraints and of dreary numerical
tabulations. Yet despite its lack of glamour, budgeting is
an essential tool for the management of large enterprises .
It is first and foremost a planning process, through which
the manager allocates the available resources to the working
units of his organization. Ideally, a budget should convert
goals, programs, and priorities into monetary terms
following rational economic analysis and decision on the
optimum means of accomplishing an agency's objectives.
Moreover, budgeting is an important device for the review
and control of the activities of the component parts of an
organization, to the end that over-all purposes and not
parochial ones are served. Thus, budgeting is inextricably
linked to the formulation of policy and the orderly
execution of programs.
The military services always (and properly) want more;
the economizers (congressmen) always (and also properly)
offer resistance, or try to impose reductions. But once the





In fact, the choices that maximize military capability
for a given budget are the same choices that minimize the
cost of attaining that capability.
This thesis examines the budgetary process in the
Venezuelan BcB, some of its legal aspects , and, analyses in
a linear model Congressional and Services behavior during
the request and appropriation phases of the budget from 1962
till 1976. It also intends to formulate a model utilized in
the U.S.A.'s DoD for budget preparation known as -Planning
Programming and Budgeting system (PPBS) as an alternative
model for the budget preparation applicable to the
Venezuelan Armed Forces, looking in some detail at its
structural aspects and how it is related to the organization
by means cf the concept called Organizational Development.
12

B. VENEZUELAN 30DGET SINCE 1962
The Venezuelan Constitution of 1961 allows for a dual
system of ordinary and extraordinary expenditures but in
doing so it expressly requires Congressional authorization
either directly or through ad hoc entities such as the
Delegated Commission (an extraordinary governmental body
formed by th€ President, the Vice-President, and 21 members
of both Houses who represent Congress' political composition
and who ars convened when the Congress is not in session).
The Constitution sets forth guidelines and limitations; one
of these guidelines requires that no expenditure can be
funded by the National Treasury unless provided for in the
budget law. Kore specific guidelines and limitations on
preparing the annual budget laws are set forth by the
Organic Law of the Treasury of 1961, which serves as the
main body of legislation not only for the activities of the
Ministry of the Treasury but also for budgetmaking and
control, regardless of ministry or agency.
From this statute it becomes apparent that several
governmental agencies play important roles in deciding the
allocation of governmental expenditures. One of these is the
Council of the Budget, an advisory body presided over by the
Minister of the Treasury and formed by him and thirteen
other members, two appointed by the Minister of the
Treasury, and one by each other minister, and ethers
appointed by the autonomous agencies. Another is the Office
of the Comptroller General, whose function it is to check
carefully the formal or legal regularity of appropriations
and acquisitions . In relation to military acquisitions the
Superior Junta of National Armed Forces acts as an advisory
body in this respect, but there does not exist any legal or
13

established procedure which regulates that activity.
The "additional credits", a budgetary practice that is
used in order to engage in extraordinary acquisitions
programs, thus circumventing some of the administrative and
Congressional checks, is permitted by law.
Purchases of military equipment and supplies are
expressly assigned a major portion of Ministry of Defense
annual allotments.
1 • The Con^stirut ion of J.96J
The Venezuelan Constitution of 1961 provides
numerous guidelines for governmental budgeting and spending.
Some of these are directed to the President of the Republic
whc, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and head
administrator of the public treasury, stands in a key
position in terms of planning and executing large
1
expenditures . The President oversees the budget
preparation and expenditure process as it develops in the
different ministries, and specifically in the Ministry of
the Treasury [Ref. 2 ,art. 193,227,228]. The president may
decree credits, above and beyond those listed in the budget
if so authorized by Congress in a joint session or by the
so-called "delegated commission" (comision delegada) [Ref. 2
,art. 190 (14) ].
For Presidential powers under the Venezuelan 1961
Constitution, see Constituciones de Venezuela, Const itucion




Budgetary legislation is initiated in the Chamber of
Deputies, which is responsible for the introduction and
initial discussion of any enactment affecting the fiscal
structure of the Nation [Ref. 2, art. 153(1) ], the timing
and manner of presentation of the budget are left to the
Organic Law of the Budget (See the Organic Law of the
Treasury of 1961 in next paragraph) , but its general
principles are carefully outlined in the constitutional
text; soie of the most significant for the purpose of this
thesis will be listed below:
1. No expenditure funded by the National Treasury
may be trade if not provided for in the budget law.
Additional credits may be decreed only for those necessary
and unforeseen expenses or those whose allotments were
insufficient, as long as the Treasury has enough means to
meet the new expenditures. In this connection, it is
necessary to obtain the favorable vote of the Council of
Ministers and the authorization of the Congress in a joint
session cr, when it can not meet, the authorization of the
Delegated Commission [Ref. 2, art. 227].
2. Congress may alter the amounts in budgetary
entries but it may not authorize expenditures which exceed
the total expected revenues [Ref. 2, art. 223].
3. The office of the Comptroller General is directed
to inspect and audit governmental income and expenditures,




2 • The Organi c Law of the Treasury of 1961
The Organic Law of the Treasury of 1961 (Ley
Organica de la Hacienda Publica Nacional) comprises some of
the most important aspects of governmental acquisitions in
Venezuela. It regulates the activity of the Ministry of the
Treasury, aDd in doing so includes the basic rules on
budget making and control. In other words, this law serves as
the Organic Law of the Ministry as well as of the Budget and
the Office of the Comptroller General.
The fiscal year starts in Venezuela on the 1st of
January and ends on the 31st of December of each year. The
various Ministers are instructed to submit to the Council of
the Budget (Consejo del Presupuesto) within the first 15
days of Jun? the detailed list of expected expenditures and
their justifications.
The Budget Council is an advisory body presided
over, ex officio, by the Minister of the Treasury and formed
by him and thirteen other members (2 appointed by the
Minister cf Treasury, one by each other Minister, and one by
the autonomous agencies (organismos a utonomos) . It is
empowered to consider the various proposals, and may object
to submitted expenditures, first by sending a detailed
objection in writing to the submitting Minister or
Ministers, subsequently by reporting to the Council of
Ministers for final decision concerning the presentation to
Congress. The final draft of the Budget must be submitted to
Congress by the Minister of the Treasury no later than the
2nd of October of each year.
16

3» IhS. 3udqet Format
The DoD budget request's format as any other
department within the Executive branch is divided into
2
chapters (capitulos) classified in accordance with their
origen and subject matter. Chapters, in turn, are divided
into entries (objetos) and sub-entries (sub-ob jetos) , each
entry listing the total amounts for sub-entries. Generally,
the entries and sub-entries have, since 1962, retained the
same or similar pre-assigned number, thus allowing a quicker
identification by the reader. For example, in the 1966
Budget, Chapter 12 is devoted to expenditures by the General
Conwnand of the Air Force (Comandancia General de la
Aviacion) . In it, entry 50 is assigned to acquisition of
machinery and equipment, subentry 500 to major parts
acquisitions, 560 to equipment for national defense and
security. By looking for these entries in preceding or
subsequent chapters, dealing, say, with the General Command
of the National Guard (Chapter 13) , an adequate tabulation
of the total expenditures for the above-listed items may be
made. A breakdown of Major Defense Programs and an example
of the structural appropriation categories are illustrated
in Fig 1
.
Since 1970, DoD changed from chapters to Drograms
as the new bases for the budget "struct ural tormat.
17

A. MAJOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS
01. Central Services









11. Public Sector Support
B-l M SJI3UCT0RAL APPROPRIATION FORMAT
PROGRAM 04 - NAIAL DEFENSE
ENTRY _50 - Material and Systems Procurement
GENERIC JU3-SNT RY 5 00
Major spare parts
SPECIFIC SUB-ENTRY 503
Major spares for Communication devices
SPECIFIC SUB-ENTRY 506







Figure 1 - VENEZUELAN MAJOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND BUDGET
FORMAT

It is important to notice here that according to
Novick [Bef.22, p. 530] the term program means the output or
ultimate goal of many interdependent activities; for
example, the combination of equipment, people, real estate,
and related activities necessary for a military mission such
as the strategic bombardment or continental defense. In the
Venezuelan case, the term program generally doesn't accord
with Novick's definition of a program; as an example note
that programs one(01) and seven(07) don't relate a
combination of activities to meet an end objective within
DoD's established mission (see figure one)
.
A careful examination of program 04 (Naval Defense)
shews a typical example of either double counting or a great
problem to the office in charge of keeping track of
expenditures; as can be seen in the Generic Sub - Entry 500
Specific Sub - Entry 503 and Generic Sub - Entry 530
including all of its specific Sub - Entries; they refer to
Communication Systems (including spare parts) as if they




The mathematical structures suggested in this thesis for
modeling congressional behavior when considering DoD iudget
requests are similar to those used by Davis, Dempster and
3
Wildavsky to describe the congressional/non-defense agency
budgetary process. Their basic structure suggests a set of
possible decision rules that are linear, stable over periods
4
of time, stochastic, and strategic in nature . In reality,
they may be thought of as "as if" models in that realizing a
gocd fit for a given model means only that the actual
behavior of the participants appears to follow the
relationship suggested by the model. The models do not
attempt tc describe the decision making process in detail
but rather in an input-output sense where the President's
budget submission may be considered to be the input
variables and final congressional appropriations as the
output quantity.
These three authors argue that there are striking
regularities in the U.S.A. budgetary process that conforms
with these models




For each model the constant or intercept term, normally
found in a linear model, is suppressed in order to interpret
the coefficient (s) as increments or percentage figures.
Although intuitively appealing, models of this type have
somewhat different statistical properties and thereby
present some difficulty in empirical testing and evaluation
(see Appendix A) .
Each model also contains a random error term which
accounts fcr events that might otherwise upset the
simplicity of the model. Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky
describe such events in the following manner:
"Occasionally, world events take an unexpected
turn, a new President occupies the White House,
some agencies act with exceptional zeal, others
suffer drastic losses of confidence on the part of
the appropriations subcommittees, and so on."
[Ref .1ft, pag. 531 ].
For each of the models the following definiticn of
variables apply:
X - agency funding reguest in year t as contained in
t
the President's budget
Y - final Congressional appropriations for a given
t




It is felt that omitting supplemental budget requests
will not significantly distort study results.
21

X - aoencv funding request in year t-1
t-1
I - final Congressional appropriations for a request
t-1
in year t-1
stochastic error or disturbance term. £ is
t
usually assumed to be normally distributed with
2
mean zero and constant variance a with the




A. SERVICE DECISION MODELS
Before attempting to model Congressional reaction toward
a submitted defense budget it is necessary to investigate
different possible strategies that the services may be using
to formulate their requests, for the Congress may know the
specific decision rule being used by the services and react
accordingly.
The first model attempts to describe a service's
behavior when, though convinced of the worth of its
programs, it realizes that extraordinarily large or small
requests tend to precipitate unfavorable Congressional
reaction. Therefore, in an effort to secure the necessary
funding, the agency will tend to request a percentage of the
previous year's appropriation. This percentage will be
stable over time. However, favorable (unfavorable) events
may generate requests that are larger (smaller) than
normally submitted. Decisions made in this manner may be
represented mathematically as:




represents the percentage of the previous
appropriation requested and £ the random error term
t
The second request model attempts to explain the actions
of the service that is convinced of the worth of its
programs regardless of previous Congressional action. This
type of behavior is especially appealing when the Congress
has confidence in the agency and tends to appropriate
amounts equal to or greater than the request submitted.
23

Accordingly, the annual request for such a program should be
a fairly stable percentage of the previous year's request
plus an error term. Thus
t t-1 t
(R2)
may be used to investigate such behavior. In the absence of
exogenous events, the request in year t should be greater
than the request in the previous year (t-1)
.
Finally, a service may desire to smooth out its stream
of appropriations by talcing into account the difference
between its request and appropriation in the previous year.
This difference may be thought of as a barometer - an
indication of how well past request (s) have been received in
order to determine which areas to emphasize in the present
budget. Such behavior may be expressed as






where 3 2 represents the percentage of the




difference between last year's appropriation and reques -
desired
.
B. CONGEISSICNAL DECISION MODELS
In order to investigate the many possible decision
strategies that the Congress may have used in determining
funding level, a series of models were postulated. Each
model attempts to link expressed congressional feelings and
desires v»ith possible behavior.
The first model considers Congressional response to a
defense
.
agency to be a function of that agency's request.
24

This type of behavior may result if the Congress feels that
the agency's requests are realistic and, as a result, a
fairly stable indication of that agency's needs to carry out
existing and planned programs. Should this be the case then
Congress may respond by appropriating a relatively fixed
percentage of the request. Such behavior may be expressed
mathematically as
Y = a x +e
t t t
(A1)
where a represents the percentage appropriated and z the
t
stochastic error term.
Next, suppose that although Congress usually grants a
fixed percentage of the agency request, it sometimes happens
that this amount represents an expenditure which extends the
agency's programs either above or below the size desired by
Congress. Such a situation could result when an agency
fellows Presidential aims which differ significantly from
these of the Congress. In this situation Congress may
appropriate a sum different from its usual percentage. Then,
in the following year, should agency and Congressional aims
become mere aligned (X approximately equal to I ) the
t t-1
Congress may attempt to make allowances for the deviation
out of the current year appropriation. If a x represents the
usual percentage appropriated then




may be used to describe such behavior; where v is the
t
stochastic disturbance term that takes on unusually large




Y = a x + a (Y -a
n
X ) + £
t t t-1 a t-1 t
(A2)
the second Congressional decision model.
Finally, specialization by subcommittee (Camaras)
members allows some members of Congress to have substantial
knowledge of the military services and their budget
formulation. This knowledge may aid the appropriation
subcommittees in identifying the decision model used by the
services to formulate their request or proposed expansion
for a given year. For example, if Congress knows that
decision model R1 was used to formulate agency requests then
the subsequent appropriation decision model may include this
information. The model
Y =ax+ctX+e
t 3 t » t t
may be used to describe such behavior when X x -6 y
t-1
Substitution for ^ Drovides for the third decision model
t





On the ether hand, should the appropriation committee
members be concerned with program expansion rate, the
expression
Y = a X + a (X -X ) + e (A4)
t 5 t 6 t t-1 t
may best describe such concern. The variable (X -X )
t t-1
should provide a reasonable indication of agency desires to
expand cr reduce its sphere of influence in a particular
field.
The series of models postulated for this study of
Congressional-DoD interaction in no way exhausts the list of
possible models; you can use the log-linear model or a
combination of R2 and R3 as the agency decision rule; this
author considers that the models suggested in this thesis
are sufficient to establish conclusive results. They are,
however, consistent with the data available and maintain the
concept of incrementalism and simple decision rules
suggested by Davis, Dempster, and tfildavsky. It should be
noted that these models do not distinguish , between actions
initiated by the House (Diputaaos) and Senate (Senadores)





C. MODEL SELECTION CRITERION
Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky have used the adjusted
coefficient of determination (R 2 ) to judge the adequacy of
the fit of the model to the data [Ref.14, p. 274].
Stromberg has noted that there are methodological problems
with linear regression without a constant term and that "R 2
is not an especially desirable measure of goodness fit." As
an alternate measure of model fit Stromberg proposed the
used of "W 2 cr proportion of variation explained"[ Ref . 9, p.
21-24 ].
To acquaint the reader with the methodological
differences between linear regression with and without a
constant term a general review of linear regression theory
for models with a constant term and its validity for models
with a suppressed constant is included in Appendix A.
Appendix B documents those statistical tests to be used for
testing and evaluation of the models proposed in the
previous sections. Particular attention is given to
identifying the impact of suppressing the constant term on
test validity. Finally, Appendix C discusses selected
ncnparametric criteria that were employed when necessary




In order to empirically test the decision models
presented in Chapter II a data base that included the
previous and current year's request and appropriation was
needed. Data sources available were:
a. summary tables prepared by the Treasury
Ministry-Office of the 3udget presenting the different
Ministries' requests before the Congress [Ref.20].
b. summary tables prepared by DoD and presented to the
Ministry cf the Treasury every year; FYs 1962-1976 [3ef.21].
Utilizing the information available in these documents
sufficient data to test the hypothesized decision models



































































{*) Not requested by normal budget presentation
Data in 1S72 constant U.S.A. millions of dollars
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Figure 4 - PERCENT of REQUEST APPROPRIATED vs TIMS; DoD:




Multiple linear regression analysis was used to test the
postulated decision rules using the data available. To
perform the regression analysis the BIOMED series of
statistical programs on simple and multiple regression was
chcsen. When the BIOMED programs are used under the
assumption of zero intercept all variances, covariancss,
standard deviations, and correlations are computed about the
origin vice the regression line (see 3MDP1R in Ref.10) . The
conseguences of such a computational procedure have been
outlined in chapter II and, as such, were considered when
selecting these models that best describe the defense
budgetary process.









= 6 Y +£
t-1 t
= B X +e
1 t-1 t
= 3 Y +6 3(Y -X ) +£2 t-1 t-1 t-1
= °< X + £
= a
,
X + a (Y - a X ) +
1 t
2 t-1 i t-1
= ax + a/x-BY ) + e
3 t * t ° t-1
= a x + a (X -X ) + e






funding request for year t
funding request for year t-1
appropriation for year t
appropriation for year t-1
stochastic error term
In this form all models except A2 and A3 were compatible
with linear regression format. For A2 the following




= a X + a Y - a i x +£
1
t 2 t-1 t-1 t
(A2*)
where a ' = a x a
2 l
The estimated coefficients ( a anda ) are consistent in
1 2
'
a statistical sense and unbiased but may be unstable (vary
with sample size) should the variables Y and X be
t- 1 t- 1
highly correlated [Ref. 7, pag. 159-1 68 ]
.
For model A3 the variable (X - 6 Y ) was estimated by
t ° t-1
direct substitution of the computed residual from model 31,
i.e.
Y = a X +a [ e (R1) ]+ z (A3*)
t 3 t » t t
Johnston [Ref. 7, pag. 376-380] has pointed out that a
and a will be unbiased, maximun-likelihood estimates cf a,
and a if e (R1) is normally distributed.
* t
These models (B1, R2, R3, A1, A2*, A3*, and A4) were
applied to the data; the results of which are included in
Appendix D- Tables I and II. In the case of A2* the
34

coefficients have been transformed back into their
structural fcrm.
Of primary importance in deciding which model best fits
the data is tie impact of suppressing the constant term. For
1 nthis end, £ = - . E e (where £ is the difference between1-1 i i
th
the i actual and estimated request or appropriation) was
computed for each model. For linear models with a constant
term L& «i
i = l
11 be zero. For the suppressed constant models
Z e will be zero if and only if the data falls in a
i = l i
symmetric pattern about the regression line. Other relevant
statistics considered were coefficient of variation (CV) and
standard error (SE) .
The statistical significance of the estimated
coefficients was tested using the two sided "t" test at the
0.05 level cf significance. Those coefficients annotated by
an asterisk (*) in tables I and II were not found to be
statistically significant, that is, it was not possible to




Application of the above criteria made possible the
selection cf the following models as being most
representative of the defense budgetary process.
1. Model HI
Sample size = 14





Sample size = 14
X = 1.001X + £
t t-1 t
(30.314)
; CV = 0. 1231
3. Model A1
Sample size = 15
Y = 1.032X + £ ; CV = 0.0651
t t t
(59.624)
Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky found that model A1
(using current year request to explain current year
appropriation) realized the best fit; a result that was also
noted in this study. Models R1 and R2 realized the best fit
explaining service behavior, which also resulted in an
incremental type request.
The number in parenthesis below each coefficient is
the computed "t" statistic for that coefficient.
36

This result suggests that the defense appropriation
process may be modelled by simple (basically incremental)
decision rules as argued by Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky
in their studies of Congressional behavior and empirical
results fcr the non-defense budgetary process.
37

III. PPEJ5 CYCLE IN THE U^jJU DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Prior tc formal budget submission to the Congress as an
integral part of the total Federal Budget, the DoD tudget
undergoes approximately 13 months of development and review
within the Defense Department. The preparation process,
known as Planning, Programming and Budgeting system or PPBS,
includes three distinct phases: planning (six months)
;
programming {nine months) ; and budgeting (three months).
The planning phase primarily involves threat analysis
and force level requirements determination to counter these
threats, first unconstrained- by cost and then under
tentative fiscal constrain ts^ established by the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) . Once the views of the
National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
the Secretary of Defense on desired force levels have been
examined and evaluated a Joint Force Memorandum or JFM is
formulated and distributed to the Services [Ref. 15],
Receipt of the JFM by the services officially signals
the beginning of the programming phase. In a continuos
dialogue between OSD and the services the manpower, weapon
system, and resource requirements necessary to obtain and
mantain those forces as outlined in the JFM are considered.
At the end of this phase OSD provides the services with
Program Decision Memorandums which review all relevant
opinions and decisions of OSD on military needs for the next
five years. Ihe end product of the programming phase is the
Five Year Defense Plan (FYD?) which contains DoD's updated
list of programs, progra n elements, force levels and
attendant resources for the ensuing fiscal year and the
38

following four years. It should be noted that this phase
emphasizes programs through coordination by the Secretary of
Defense across service lines and the determination and
evaluation of tradeoffs among programs and program elements.
Programming requires the full program cost concept,
otherwise it is not possible to compare alternative uses of
resources. Each program element is carried in the FYDP with
a full breakdown of forces assigned to that element (for
instance, if the element is Navy Tactical Air Force Wings,
forces would be the number of sguadroms) . Full costs of
investment or acquisition, research and development, and
operations are further broken down into "appropriations"
such as Procurement, and Operations and Maintenance.
The matrix shown in fig. 5 will give you a general idea
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Figure 5 - FYDP STRUCTURE, AN EXAMPLE OF
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Since the FYDP is both a record of historical costs and
a program of future costs, costs are displayed in consonance
with the year they represent: costs for the years prior to
the current year are actual obligations; current year costs
are actual when known, otherwise they are the programmed
costs; budget year and out-year costs should reflect price
indices or inflationary trends, except where controlled by
law. The final phase, budgeting, occurs during the period
from October through December inmediately preceding
submission of the budget to the Congress in January. Up to
this point the budget has been considered in program format
and must now be transformed into appropriation categories
before being submitted to the Congress. This transformation
(Known as crosswalking) is the process by which resources
needed to support the program elements are aggregated into
appropriation categories. As an illustration of this
process, consider Figure 6. Determination of MILITARY
PERSONNEL reguir em ents-NAVY <M?N) involves going through all
program elements in the Navy budget and summing their
individual MILITARY PERSONNEL resource requirements. This
sum represents the total NAVY MILITARY PERSONNEL funding
needs. A similar procedure is followed to determine the
other appropriation category requirements. A complete
breakdown of Major Defense Programs and Congressional
Appropriation Categories is included as Figure 7.
Once the program needs are crosswalked into the various
appropriation categories they are forwarded to OSD and the
office of Management and Eudget (0M5) for review and
integration into the President's Federal budget and
subsequent submission to the Congress.
Completion of the formal PPB cycle in no way marks the
end of DoD's consideration of its budget request. In
reality, subuission of the budget to Congress signifies the
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beginning of a new dialogue; this time between the Congress
and the Department of Defense. During the Authorization and
Appropriation Committees' review of the defense budget a
reguest for additional information on a specific line item
(for example, Navy A-7E Attack Aircraft) or the impact of a
reduction in funding for an entry program will generate
further analyses of that line item by OSD or the service
involved. This guestion and answer process tends to reveal
the strengths or weaknesses of a reguest and the underlying
desires cf Congress.
After the legislative procedure has concluded in both
the House and Senate with the determination of actual
funding levels the final Defense Appropriation Bill will
delineate the level of New Obligational Authority (NOA)
allocated to the appropriation categories and represents an
upper limit to which the Federal Government may be obligated
by the Defense Department during the obligational period
associated with a specific appropriations category (see
Figure 7 for lengths of obligational periods)
.
The final phase of the budget cycle is conducted ty the
services after the defense budget is signed into law by the
President. During this phase the Congressional allocations
to the appropriation categories are crosswalked back into
Defense tudget format. If a specific program element has





NAVY BUDGET CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
PROGRAM I - Strategic Forces







Total Requirements-Polaris = $XXXX
Total Requirements Strategic
Forces = $XXXX
PROGRAM II - General Purpose Forces
Program Element : F-14 Squadrons
Military Personnel $XXXX-



















Total Operations & Maintenance
PROCUREMENT AIRCRAFT & MISSILES
Army
Navy
Total Requirements - F1A = $XXXX
Total Requirements - General
Purpose Forces = $XXXX
PROGRAM III - Intelligence & Communications
Total Navy Requirements = $XXXX Total Defense Budget
Figure 6 - "CROSSWALKING" THE DEFENSE BUDGET INTO




O(Zero)- Support of Other Nations
I Strategic Forces
II General Purpose Forces
III Intelligence & Communications
IV Airlift & Sealift
V Guard & Reserve Affairs
VI Research & Development
VII Central Supply & Maintenance
VIII Training, Medical & Other Personnel Activities
IX Administration & Associated Activities
B. CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATION CATEGORIES
Obligational
Period
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 2 years
Procurement (except Shipbuilding and
Conversion) 3 years
Shipbuilding and Conversion 5 years
Military Construction 2 years
Military Personnel 1 year
Reserve Personnel 1 year
Operations and Maintenance 1 year
Figure 7 - MAJOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND CONGRESSIONAL
APPROPRIATION CATEGORIES; A LISTING OF
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A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTROL OF THE BUDGET
The Secretary of Defense can exercise control in the
very begining cf the phase at the appropriations step and
further extend this control through the allocation process,
the obligation process and reprogramming activities; also
transfers can be effective tools of control available to the
Department of Defense.
Once the Defense Appropriation Bill is passed by the
Congress, it is binding as to how much the DoD can obligate
thereunder and, within its broad purposes, what can be
bought
.
The apportionment process, exercised through 0M3,
reflects Presidential control and can restrict the rate or
purpose cf obligations as provided by law. Apportionments
are made on the basis of hearings conducted by OMB, office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) , and DoD components
wherein apportionment requests are considered. This
apportionment process also serves the important function of
updating the fcudget which was submitted to CSD more than a
year previously. Cnce the apportionment is released by 0MB,
it becomes the Secretary of Defense's authorized obligation
rate.
The Secretary of Defense exercises his primary financial
control by establishing the rate of obligations of funds for
the DoD components based on the CMS a'pport ionment release.
Departments cf the Army, Navy, and Air Force will submit to
the Assistant Secretary of Defense Comptroller their
proposed operating budgets and financial plans for review in
anticipation cf the formal submission of an apportionment
uu

request based on the appropriations act.
Upon receipt of these plans and budgets, analysts from
OSE evaluate in substantive detail and make their
recommendations to the Comptroller based on evaluations of
program proposals (feasibility, desirability, priorities,
timing, etc.)* procurement, and research and development
line items. It is at this point that the Secretary of
Defense can exercise additional financial control by
deferring programs until later in the budget execution
program. This is used to restrict the flow of funds, as well
as to ccntrcl programs by withholding funding authorization
until complete justification is provided.
To meet changing needs, the Secretary of Defense has the
authority, with the approval of the Office of Management and
3udget, to transfer funds from one appropriation account to
another if such transfers do not exceed statutory limits.
There are four other methods besides the transfer authority
available tc CSD and the Department of Defense components
which provide flexibility within appropriations. These are
Supplemental Budget, Contract Authorization, Deficiency
Budgets, and Heprogramming
.
Supplemental Budgets and Deficiency Budgets are in
essence additions to the annual budget proposed by the
Secretary of Defense to request funds for major unforeseen
emergencies during the current year.
The
,
Secretary of Defense's funding authorization
provides agencies with a document which establishes
authorized funding levels; i.e., obligational authority for
both direct and reimbursable programs for each
appropriations and expense authority for military personnel
of the Active Forces. Generally, this document establishes
applicable program, budget activity, procurement line item,
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and program element distributions of the total resources for
the year. These documents are revised during the course of
the year to reflect appropriation enactment, releases from
deferral, reprogramming or other actions which affect the
funding authority.
Agencies submit monthly reports to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense reflecting the status of avilable
funds. These reports are forwarded for review to the Office
of Management and Budget and the House Appropriations
Committee.
An annual report is prepared by the department
Comptrollers and submitted to the Office of Secretary of
Defense in December as the previous end-of-year (30
September) unobligated and unexpended balances, as well as
the unpaid obligations, of all appropriations and funds.
This report is submitted to the Treasury Department for
establishing year-end balances and to withdraw or restore
funds as necessary.
1 • Allocation
Following the establishment of the rats of
obligation, which is quite an involved process, the
Secretary of Defense allocates funds to responsible
officials in their organizations. These allocations are
usually divided into sub-allocations, allotments, and
sufc-allotments or are included in operating budgets at the
user level to make funis available for commitment,
obligation and expenditure. A commitment is a reservation of
funds based upon currently directed use leading to
obligations. An obligation is a liability; e.g., a firm
contract for goods or services. An expenditure is payment
of the obligation. Allocations, commitments, obligations,
46





A crucial step in the spending process exists in the
obligation of funds. Many decisions regarding the timing of
obligations are initiated at the agency level. If an agency
fails to obligate by a certain time, the funding authority
lapses and reverts to the Treasury.
Tn this respect many controversies still exist and
legislation is usually changing to try to enforce its
cotrmitment.
3 • Reprcgra mmin g
In the area of budgetary control within the
Department of Defense, reprogramming is an effective
technique of budgetary control in the execution process.
Reprogramming is essentially a process of moving funds
within a single appropriation account.
Congress appropriates lump-sum amounts to the
Defense Department. It is the understanding of the
Appropriations Committees and of the Congress that the
monies will be spent in accordance with the original
departmental justifications as appropriately amended.
As the budget year unfolds, new and tetter
applications of money come to light. Reprogrammings are made
for a number of reasons, including unforeseen developments,
changing requirements, incorrect price estimates, wage rate
adjustments, changes in the international situation, and
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legislation enacted subsequent to appropriations.
Though reprogramming offers the Secretary of Defense
an effective tool for preserving management flexibility, it
also provides the opportunity for substantial re-emphasis of
policy. Cne such possibility is requesting funds for a
popular program today, knowing Congress will provide the
funds, and reprogram for a disfavored project tomorrow.
4 • Transfers
The Department of Defense Appropriation Act contains
language which grants to the Secretary of Defense authority,
with the approval of the Office of Management and Budget, to
transfer funds in the currant fiscal year upon determination
that such action is necessary and in the national interest.
The transfer authority is normally stated as a dollar
limitation net to exceed a specified amount available to the
Department of Defense for military functions (except
military construction) . Transferred amounts are merged with
and made available for the same purpose and time period as
the appropriation or fund to which it is transferred. The
Appropriation Act also provides the additional criteria that
must be applied to the use of the transfer authority and to
reguests for ether proposed reprogramming actions. Transfers
are not authorized unless for higher priority items, based
en unforeseen military requirements, than those for which
originally appropriated and in no case where the item for
which funds are requested has been denied by the Congress.
The Secretary of Defense is required to notify the Congress
promptly of all transfers.
u8

B. STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF PPBS
The first step in PPBS is to identify and examine
objectives. This objectives could emanate from a broad
national purpose such as to defend our National
Sovereignity. Towards such a goal, there are intermediate
objectives such as National Defense, Social Development, and
Economic Development. Under National Defense there ars more
concrete objectives in areas such as Air Defense, Naval
Defense, Maritime Patrol. Under Air Defense, for example,
there are specific objectives such as Fighter Squadrons,
Cargo Aircraft, which result in a hierarchy of objectives.
A hierarchy of objectives is the criterion for the
program structure. A program, in the PPBS sense, is an
integrated activity-a combination of labor, material, and
7
capital whose output is related to an objective
Accordingly, the activities are assembled by programs,
sub-programs, and program elements at respective levels of
aggregation.
See David Novick, "Which program do we mean in
program budgeting?" The Rand Corporation, p. 530, May 12,
1954. It emphasized that the program is also 'the primary
unit for management and planning at the policy level.
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The building of the program structure does not have to
flew from top to bottom. It may be more practical to start
from on-gcing programs which can be worked either upwards or
downwards. Then the balance of activities may be aggregated
upwards resulting in new identified programs.
After a program structure has been matched-out to the
hierarchy of objectives, the outputs of the program
categories are analyzed in terms of their respective
objectives. This is done for more specificity if not
quantification. For example, a Maritime Patrol program has
operational output of patrol hours/day. However the real
output of this program may be deterrence against any
possible enemy incursion. But outputs of this nature are not
easily measurable at all levels of the program hierarchy.
Furthermore, maritime patrol may consist of an air and sea
element, and, in this case operational outputs of activities
or programs elements are mixed into program outputs cf the
next large grouping. Thus, analytical approaches have to be
developed to be able to express the mixture of lower level
outputs as an aggregated. -
In recognition of this difficulty, the program outputs
may only be quantified at the level of the program elements
[Ref.3, pag. 25]. In this manner, the proposed expenditure
data can still be related to performance. Program elements
should produce clearly definable outputs, which are
quantified wherever possible; and whenever feasible, the
output should be an end product and not an intermediate
product that supports another program element [Rei. 4,
pag. 3]. In the Defense case, air defense is an unmeasurable
element, so, indirect measures have to be used, such as the
number cf CF-5 squadrons. After the possible measures of
outputs are established, the desired output levels are
determined. These levels of outputs and the alternatives to
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attain them are major considerations of the program
analysis. Nevertheless, PPBS does not start from nothing.
There are statistical indicators accumulated in the existing
budgeting, accounting, and information systems. The process
of program structuring draws from data that may not have
seemed important in the past. The program structure costed
for a fiscal year is known within this context as the
Program Eudget.
These pcints can be summarized by looking at some
characteristics of a program structure. These are shown in
Fig. 8 [Ref.5, rag. 4].
Relates Objectives and Activities.
- Identifies objectives
- Provides measurables objectives
- Includes ail activities
- Allows for growth (flexibility)
SujsjDorts Decisi onmaking^
- Illuminates priorities
- Highlights trade-off areas
- Promotes realistic analysis
- Provides for imaginative change
- Is manageable
Figure 8 - CHARACTERISTICS OF A PROGRAM STRUCTURE
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In general, these are the characteristics of a program
structure that make a program structure, and the resulting
program budget, a useful information display. Information is
provided about what is being done and how the resources are
allocated. The program structure allows for growth by
providing stable goal-oriented programs that are
sufficiently broad to encompass a wide variety of program
elements (Mirage squadrons, Frigate Divisions for example)
in the future, and it provides the basis for measuring how
well program objectives are being met. This projection into
the future may be called the Multi-Year Program Budget
(MPB) , or what was called Program and Financial Plan
(PFP)[Ref. 6]. A PFP for five years is not to be confused
with the tudget proposal for five years, It is not a
projection of future activities in the sense that decisions
may be made to reduce, enlarge, or eliminate some program
alternatives. The PFP projects the future implications of
current budgetary decisions. It is not a prediction of
future decisions.
This extended time horizon is important in investment
decisions where the life-cycle costs of the equipment or
asset must be considered. It also reminds the resource
mobilizer and allocator that there are recurrent costs.
These costs may be covered by existing legislation outside
of the annual legislative process on the government budget.
To summarize, the structural aspects of PPBS consists of
the hierarchy of objectives, program structure, program
budget, and the multi-year program budget.
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C. ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND P?B
There are several assumptions underlying the use of
Organizational Development (OD) and ?PB for planning
purposes. First, it is assumed that the employees (Military
Personnel for our purpose) are considered to be valuable
resources, and are managed as any other scarce resource
within the military organization in the most effective way.
A second assumption is that while the PPB system will
continue to use some prescribed methods, there will be an
attempt tc use more effective means for involving people in
the organization. The analysis, program structure, and data
collection phases of PPBS will remain the same, but the
goal-setting and ob jactive-setting aspects will be changed
significantly and there will be some modification in the
control phase.
A third assumption underlying the marriage of PPB and OD
is that -this approach to planning purposes will be
systematic (system-wide) and pervasive (massive in scope)
over time [Eef. 16, pag.43]. It would take a number of
years to implement such a program, and PPB is pervasive in
that it demands a very substantial organizational
commitment, even calling for reorganization in some cases.
It is obvious that humans constitute the work force
responsible for exercising efficiency and meeting
organizational goals (one of the fundamental aspects of
PPBS) , therefore, using OD and ?P3 concurrently will allow
for total systematic planning, and the dual approach
addresses itself to both the data-related and people-related
problems in the organization.
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It is important in the goal-setting process that persons
at all levels of the organization be involved in setting
objectives appropriate to their own spheres of work.
Involving people in this way enhances their conmitment to
the whole specific program and facilitates the future
implementation.
Many planners within the Military Organization do not
allow for a two-way goal-setting process. In the
objective-setting stage of any particular program, those who
participate are often required to set objectives within the
goal parameters already established by those in the upper
echelons of the hierachy. In other words, the emphasis is on
relating one's objectives to the organization's goals,
rather than on also considering the goals of those in the
system and allowing them to influence the purposes of the
organization. This rather limited form of goal-setting with
its one-way thrust (downward) could tend to prevent
subordinates from really "owning" the objectives they set.
This type of approach tends to be similar as that cf the
System Analyst, he usually is only concerned with the output
of the organization; he makes recommendations as to the most
effective utilization of resources to get a desired effect
on the environment. His view of the inside of the
organization tends to assume that information is the main
thing moving upwards, while decisions about objectives,
alternatives, and perhaps even techniques move downward
[Kef . 18].
Archibald [Bef.18] states the following characteristics
of the system analysts view of organizations:
(1) There is
centralization.
tendency toward elitism and/or
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(2) The organization is primarily viewed as acting on
its external environment.
(3) Systems Analysts usually don't talk about helping a
client, rather they talk of improving decisionmaking.
(4) They are interested in the effectiveness of a
decision.
(5) If the client: does not accept their recommendations,
they tend to assume that the client is of lower intelligence
than them.
Related to two-way goal setting, there exists the
concept of shared organizational control, that is, most
human systems operate under conditions of change wherein it
is impossible to completely legislate subordinate behavior,
the military organizations being an exception to this rule,
for there are very well established roles and
responsabilities among its members and a relationship of
trust exists between superiors and subordinates. Although
the control system used by the military organization
apparently conforms to a strict hierarchial control, it can
be expected that many powerful person; in th<
organization— those who have already established their
criteria (relative to a specific subject) - will oppose any
program which changes their influence. Others may see the
new method as an opportunity to gain influence quickly under
new conditions.
Organizational controls originating from superior and
conveyed downward to subordinates (e. g ., rules, processes)
should be accompanied in effective organizations with




When control is one-way, there tends to be token
compliance to the "letter of the law," overemphasis on the
items to re measured and used as criteria, overemphasis on
the short-rather than the long-run, covering up infractions
of the rules and exercising other forms of dishonest
behavior, and a reduction in subordinate creativity which
comes from allowing discretion within which creative
potential can unleashed [Ref.17, pag . 381- 385 ].
Another aspect that is worth mentioning is that most
planning within the military context relies heavily on
hierarchial control; superiors demand written objectives by
a certain date, these objectives must conform to the rules
for writing them. Subordinates are expected to comply with
rather stringent system constraints and manage their own
objectives within those parameters. The threat of a bad
fitness report or unexpected change in duty station, or of
loosing a particular opportunity for promotion looms as a
punishment
.
This environmental climate provides Systems Analysts one
way to achieve organizational goals creating some semblance
of order "useful for action purposes". Thus it is the System
Analyst who will say "Most of your time has to be spent in
figuring out what the problem is."
Wildavsky [Ref.19] argues that Systems Analysts have
tended to ignore people problems within organizations, or,
to fit thee into a rationalistic model. In the OD approach
(or clinical approach as for Archibald) , the clinical expert
prefers to work with all levels of an organization during
the course of his association with it. The decisions are not
seen as being imposed from on high; rather decisionmaking is




The characteristics of the Organizational Development
approach have been described by Archibald as:
(1) There is a tendency to see the ideal decision- making
process as participatory.
(2) The organization is primarly viewed as acting and
rsacting internally.
(3) The clinical axpert talks about helping the
organization to change.
(4) There is a tendency to be more concerned anout the
internal acceptability of decisions that about either their
effectiveness or their pclitical feasibility.
(5) The client is seen neither as stupid nor as
responding rationally to pressures, but rather as a social
system which because of its complexity has difficulties
living up to its full potential.
In conclusion, a method for making human behavior in an
organization more effective was presented, and a comparison
with the System Analysis approach was established. This
method known as Organizational Development when used in
conjucticn with PPE, could prove to be an effective way for






Military technology nowadays alone, would make necessary
the central planning and direction of the military program.
The technical complexity cf modern day weapons, their
lengthy period of development, their tremendous combat power
and enormous cost have placed an extraordinary premium on
sound choices of major weapon systems. These choices have
become, for the top management of the Defense Department,
the key decisions around which much else of the Defense
program revolves. They cannot be made properly by any
subordinate echelon of the Defense establishment. They must
be directly related to our national security objectives
rather than simply to the tasks of just one of the military
services
.
The revolution in military technology must not only
change the character of our military program, it must also,
to a significant degree blur the lines of demarcation among
the various services. Most of our major military missions
today require the participation of more than one of the
military services. Therefore, our principal concern now
must be centered on what is required by the Defense
establishment as a whole to perform a particular military
mission-net on what is required of a particular service to
perform its part of that mission. This is not only true with
regard tc the planning cf our military forces and programs,




Within the Venezuelan DoD, each military service in turn
prepares its tasic budget submission, allocating its request
among its own functions, units, and activities, and present
additional reguests, by means of additional credits. Then
all the budget submissions are reviewed together by the
Minister of Defense's Budget Office.
This authcr believes that this procedure is a rather
inefficient way to go about preparing the Defense budget.
Among its consequences we can cite that each service tends
to exercise its own priorities, favoring its own unique
missions to the detriment of joint missions, striving to lay
the groundwork for an increased share of the budget in
future years by concentrating on alluring new weapon
systems, and protecting the overall size of its own forces
even at the cost of readiness.
Another unsatisfactory aspect of this method is the
almost complete separation between budgeting and military
planning. The planning horizon extends years into the future
but the budget is projected only one year ahead. Military
requirements tend to be stated in absolute terms, without
reference to their costs. But the military effectiveness or
military worth of any given weapon system cannot logically
be considered in isolation. It must be considered in
relation to its cost-and in a world in which resources are
limited, to the alternative uses to which the resources can
be put. Military requirements are meaningful only in terms
of benefits to be gained in relation to their costs.
Accordingly, resource costs and military worth have to be
scrutinized together.
This authcr also believes that the existing system of
programmatic and financial review is incapable of providing
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all the information necessary to make decisions that have to
be made.
The most significant findings found according to this
author's criteria were:
First - no one really knows the total cost of a weapon
system because the costs of its individual parts are
characteristically scattered among a number of separate
budget programs.
Second - rarely does a proposal identifiy and evaluate
the future commitment of funds implied in the initial
procurement decision. A new weapon system passes through
stages of research and development; if it is put into
operation, there is a requirement for trained personnel to
run it, logistic support to maintain it, and facilities to
repair it, at the very least, for as long as the system
continues to be used. The costs of these activities,
although clearly attributable to the weapon sytem, are not
generally available to the decision makers.
Third - in the absence of full information as to total
costs of entire programs over their lifetime, budgets are
essentially conglomerations of piecemeal data, each
representing an annual expenditure for a single fragment of
an often unrecognized whole. Budget deadlines create
pressures aggravating the woes of all concerned by shutting
off any possibility of analysis in depth.
Fourth - there is no review system that can make
comparisons between alternatives. For if the available data
for each system is fragmented and incomplete, then obviously
there could be no relative evaluations of competing systems.
Oversimplified though these statements may be, they do
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B. AREAS SUGGESTED FOR FURTHER STUDY
(a) Time-series regression analysis has been used to
investigate the applicability of the Davis, Dempster, and
Wildavsky models to the Defense budgetary process. This
author feels that questions have been raised about the
validity of a model's statistical properties and test
results when using linear models with a suppressed constant
term. A survey of available theory on linear regression
analysis revealed that few textbooks addressed the subject
explicitly, and those that did, approached the topic in
general terms. Further researcn in this area is required to
establish the statistical properties of incremental scodels
and appropriate test procedures.
(b) FPBS is not the only budgeting system used as a base
for the budget formulation and preparation in governmental
agencies. The search for different systems in this area with
specific applications to the Venezuelan DoD, is suggested by
this author.
(c) Techniques for implementing PPBS within the
Venezuelan DoD should be investigated. This author feels
that this is one of tae most delicate aspects in the
innovation of any type of idea or technique. Special
attention should be given to this suggestion in order to





A. LINEAE REGRESSION WITH A CONSTANT TERM
Suppose that there are n observations (X ,Y ),
t t
(X ,Y ), , (X ,Y ) where X is defined as the
t+1 t+1 t+n t+n t
independent variable and Y the dependent variable. Further
suppose that after plotting these n observations a linear
relationship of the form
Y =3+Sx+e ; t=1,
t o i t t
(1)
where: Y and X are as previously defined
t t
p„ = the constant term
$
l
= the slope coefficient
£
t = random error term (difference between actual and





The sum cf squares of deviations from the regression line is
n n
S = I" £2= Z(Y-3-3X) 2
t=1 t t=1 to it (2)
The objective of least-squares regression is to select 6
and 3 (estimators of 6 and (3 ) to be those values which.
1 o 1
when substituted for B and 3, , produce the least possible
1
value cf S. These values may be determined by
differentiating equation (2) ; first with respect to 3 and
then 3 and setting these results equal to zero. The
sclution to the two resulting equations (called Normal
equations) is
n n n
I X Y -[ (I X)(I Y ) ] /n
t=1 t t t=1 t t = 1 t
n n
I X 2 - ( I X ) 2 / n
t=1 t t=1 t
(3)
and 6 = ¥ - 3 X
o 1
(4)
Up to this point no assumptions that involve probability
distributions have been made. If it can be assumed that, in
equation (1)
a. £ is a random variable with mean zero and constant
t
2
variance G (unknown) ; and
b. £ and £ are uncorr elated , i#0
t t + 1
then the Gauss-Markov theorem insures that the least-squares
estimators 3 and 3 are minimum variance, unbiased
o 1





If it is further assumed that the e 's are
t
c. independently, identically distributed normal random
variates with mean zero and variance cr 2 , that is,
e % N(0,a 2 )
t
then S and 3, achieved the Cramer-Rao lower bound for
o 1
variance cf an estimator [Ref.7, pag.3-33].
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B. LINEAR REGRESSION WITHOUT A CONSTANT TERM
If, instead of equation (1) , suppose that the
relationship
Y = B X +£ ; t=1, ,n (5)
t 1 t t
is postulated for the data. The sum of squares of deviations
frcm the regression line then becomes
S' = I £ 2 = y ( y -S.x ) 2 (6)
t=1 t t=1 t t
Minimization of S' yields only one Normal equation from
which the estimator for 6 may be derived.
n
I X Y




Since there is but one Normal equation, the sum of the error
terms ( £e ) may or may not equal zero for linear
t = l t
regression without a constant.
The importance of this result becomes apparent when
reviewing the assumptions outlined in section A. If the
regression line naturally passes through the origin then B Q
and |£ will be zero. If, however, tire regression linet-i
^
does not pass through the origin and the constant term is
suppressed then I e will not be zero. Should this be the
t-1 t






STATISTICAL CRITERIA FOR TESTING LINEAR REGRESSION MODELS
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS
The t-statistic is used to test the statistical
significance cf a coefficient and is defined as the ratio of
the difference between the coefficient's estimated and
hypothesized value and its standard error; that is
t = ArJ.
3
[ Ref . 7, pag. 3*7 ] . Theoretically the error terms need to be
normally distributed with mean zero and constant variance.
However, there are simulations which have shown "t" to be
fairly robust towards distributional assumptions. Therefore,
the "t" test will be considered valid for linear models with
a suppresed constant.
B. COEFFICIENT OF DETERMINATION
Coefficient of determination or R 2 is a standard measure
of "goodness of fit" for linear regression models and is
defined as the proportion cf (sample) variance (in the
dependent variable) explained by the fitted regression line.
When all the dependent variable observations in the sample
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coincide with the least-squares regression estimates R 2
equals one, a perfect fit. As the proportion of total
variance that remains unexplained increases, R 2 approaches
zero.
The usual computational formula for estimating P 2 for a
data sample is
R 2 = 1 -
z (Y -y ) 2
t = i t t
2, <Y -Y) 2
t = 1 t
= 1
-
unexplained variation of the dependent
variable about the regression line
total variance of the dependant
variable about its mean
[Ref.8, pag.45].
Replacing (Y -Y ) 2 by e 2 , the square of the error term
t t t
for observation t f the formula for R 2 used here will be.
R 2 = 1 -
I £ 2
i=1 i
I (Y -Y) 2
i = 1 i
Stromterg [ Re f . 9 , pag. 2 1 -42 ] has pointed out that the
n
interpretation of I e as the (sample) unexplained variance
i = l i
is not correct for linear regression models without a
n
constant term since I £ may or may not be zero. Injecting
i-1 i
into the expression for R 2 will nor help since one could
theoretically cbtain a high coefficient cf determination
when the average error about the regression line is large
but the spread about this average is small.
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Stromberg and the BIOMED statistical package [Ref. 10]
have addressed this problem by computing a somewhat
different statistic. They have computed, instead, what









unexplained variation of the
dependent variable about zero
total variation of the dependent
variable about zero
The problem with this measure of goodness of fit is that
zero and the regression line appears to have been chosen
somewhat arbitrarily as the point about which the variation
in the dependent variable is computed. Also, if is equal
to or near zero (which will be the case if the computed
intercept using a standard linear regression approach is
zero) then with a positive Y (which is always the case with
budget data) V! 2 may yield a value considerably larger than
R 2 and may be misleading to someone thinking in terms of R 2 .
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C. STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE AND COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION
Another treasure of dispersion about the regression line
is the standard error of the estimate (SE) and may be
determined by using the formula
where: n = the number of sample observations
k = the number of parameters being estimated in the
regression
[Ref.7 f pag.129]. The numerical value of the standard error
of estimate is inversely related to the goodness cf fit of
the model.
It is somewhat difficult, however, to determine the
significance of the standard error of estimate when
comparing different sets of data. For this reason it is
useful to compute a relatively standard error of estimate.
The coefficient of variation (CV) is such a measure since it
relates the standard error of a particular model to the mean




A value of less than 0.20 for the coefficient of variation
for a model is freguently cited as desirable [ Ref . 3 ,pag. 44 ].
One particularly desirable characteristic of both the
standard errcr of estimate and coefficient of variation is
that they are not dependent upon any distributional




NONPARAMETRIC CRITERIA FOR TESTING LINEAR REGRESSION MODELS
A. THE MANN-WHITNEY U TEST
The Mann-Whitney test may be used to test whether two
data sets have been drawn from the same population and is
useful when underlying distributional assumptions are
questionable
.
First, suppose that there appears to be two distinct
sets of data; set A of size n and set B of size ra. To test
the null hypothesis that both sets are from the same
population against the alternative hypothesis that they are
not, the sample observations are ranked in order of
increasing size; that is, assign the rank. 1 to the smallest
value in the combined sample, the rank 2 to the next
smallest, and so on to the largest, which receives the rank
n+m. Let H (1 ) and R (Y ) denote the rank assigned to the set
i J
of values frcm population n and m respectively.
The value cf the U statistic is computed by the formula:
T = S- (n) (n+1) /2
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where S = the sum of ranks assigned to the observations from
population 1. That is,
n
S = I R (X )
i = l i
[Hef.11, pag.224]. Reject the null hypothesis at ^he level
of significance a if T is greater than 1 - »/2 quantile
0* or less than the a/2 guantile Q





The Durbin-Wat son test and examination cf residual plots
provide insight into identifying problems of
misspecif icaticn and bias, respectively. However, in the
case of of snail samples (as in budget data for DoD) these
techniques are often inconclusive. Also, the Durbin- watson
test requires that the sum of the error terms equal zero.
As an alternative means of identifying bias and/or
misspecif icaticn in a model with a suppressed constant term
Theil's methodology for comparing estimates and actual
observations was considered [Ref.12, pag. 19-32].
Theil uses the idea of mean square error (MSS) in
defining an inequality coefficient a as
where: A = the actual value of observation i
i




Next, the numerator of U is decomposed in the following
manner:
1 n
- I (P -A )2 = (?-A) 2 + (S -s ) 2 + 2(1-r)S Sni=1ii pa pa
where :
1 n
P = - Z P
n i=1 i
1 n
A = - I A
n i=1 i
1 n
I (P -P) 2





r = [ ± I (P -P) {A -A) ]/S S
n i= 1 i i pa
The first terra (P-A) 2 will be zero if and only if the
average predicted value equals the average sample value.
Positive values of the first term will be errors of central
tendency cr bias. The second term (S -S ) 2 will be zero if
? a
and only if the standard deviations are equal. Positive
values for this term indicate errors of unequal variation.
The third term (2(1-r)S S ) is zero if and onlv if the
P a
correlation coefficient between the predicted and actual
values (r) is one (that is, if the predicted values always
account for variations in the actual values) or if S and/or
P




A more convenient way of expressing this decomposition




± I (P -A ) 2
n i=1 i i
(S -S ) 2
P a
n
1 I (P -A ) 2
n i= 1 i i
2 (1-r) S 5
p a
1 n
- I (P -A ) 2
n i=1 i i
U , , and U may be characterized as inequality
b m r
proportions where is the bias proportion; U the variance
b m
proportion; and U the covariance proportion. Obviously
r
U +U + U =1.
b m r
If the above inequality proportions are to be of value
they must provide some insight into the quality of the
estimating relationship being evaluated. The term, U
,
b
should be close to zero since least-squares estimation
techniques are used to derive coefficient estimates. A high
value of U indicates that the variance of the independent
m
variable has not been properly accounted for. In such a case
a search for ether explanatory variables is in order. In
other words, the regression equation is not properly
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specified. A high value of U (along with low values cf 0"
r b
and ) indicates that the equation is unbiased and properly
m
specified, but the inherent variation in the independent
variable cannot be completely explained^ Ref . 13 ].
While the preceding discussion is brief it does point
out the problems with testing incremental regression models.
Additionally, no single criteria is a reliable test of the
postulated models. Therefore, the outcome of all of the test
staxistics will be used to evaluate the data selected to





fiODEL : R1 R2 R3
(t-value)









SE • 36.3117 35.4455 35.9310
CV : 0. 1261 0.1231 0.1243
W2 C.9354 0.9 861 0.986 8







U (?) : 99.593 99.63 99.61
* indicates that the variable may not be considered
statiscally different from zero.
Table I - SERVICE DECISION MODELS RESULTS
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MODEL : A1 A2 A3 A4











SE : 1S.2892 21.4208 20.7385 20.6066











0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04
(X) 0.22 1.31 1.28 1 .78
U {%) : 9 9.71 98.65 98.68 98. 18
* indicates that the variable may not be considered
statiscally different from zero.
Table II - CONGRESSIONAL DECISION MODELS RESULTS
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A. RESULTS OF MANN-WHITNEY TESTS FOR DATA HOMOGENEITY
The Mann-Whitney U test was used to test data
homogeneity in Service's request for the periods FYs
1962-1970 and FYs 1971-1976. The reason behind this
separation in periods arose because of the adoption of a
program denomination in the budget presentation since 1970.
Under the null hypothesis the data subsets are drawn from
the same population (H : G (x) = F(x)) . To test this
o
hypothesis against the alternative hypothesis that they are
not from the same population (H : G (x) = F (x) ) we used a two
tailed test with a significance level of .05, and the
following result was found:
a. FYs 1962-1970 vs FYs 1971-1976
S = 56 T = 11
= 1 1 a =43
(9,6,. 025) (9, 6, .975)





1. Hitch, C.J. / and McKean, R.N., The Economics ofDefense in the Nuclear Aqe, Atheneun, 7975,
2. Congreso Nacional, Constitution de la RgEublica de
ZSHizuela, Diseme, 1TT3 ,
3. Ott, D., and Ott, A., Federal Budget Policy, The
Brookings Institution, 1969,
4. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
Pla np i nq-Program in ir.q-3ud get ing, Committee or Government
Uperaticns, YSoB,
5. Haggart, S.A., A symposium on Educational Planning and
PjZ2i3I a I!! Eudgetino an Analysis ol "Implementat ion , R3TD"Corporation, T!c^ober ,~"T"97T,
6. Executive Office of the President, Attachment 3 .(PF?
Guidance) to bulletin 6 8-9, Bureau of tne Budget,
I?fiI7"T5687~
7. Johnston, J., Economet rics Methods, McGraw Hill, 1972,
8. Rand Corporation, An Introduction to Equipment Cost
Estimating, Military Equipment Cost Analysis, D"eceml5er,
T9S9~;
—
9. Strcmberg, J. I., The Internal Mechanism of the Defense
Budget Process^ Fiscal TJJS3-19F8T R"A"UD Corporation,
10. Dixcn, 3i.J. f BIOMEDICAL ComDuter Programs, University
of Calif crma, B~er£eTey aTT3 Los XngelesT T963,
11. Conover, W.J., Practical Nonparametric Statistics,
Wiley, 1971,
12. Theil, H,, Applied Economic Forescastina,
North-Hclland, 196o,




Davis, O.A., Dempster, A.H., and Wildavskv, A., " A
theory of the Buagetary Process", Th e American
Political Sc ien ce Review, v. 60, p. D29-b4 7 ,
S'ept'emc'er, T3WT
Center for Naval Analysis, Report no, 644-73, Navy
responses to changes in the Derense R~esource~Planning
Process, Kanter, H.E., and Anger, T.E., p. 15-21,
March, 1973.
16. Derr, C.E., A symoosiu a on Educational Planning and
P^o^a. 3 Budg eti ng an Inalvsis oT Tm^Temen^a^ion , RANT
Corporation, October , 1971,
17. Sayles, L.R., and Strauss, G., Human Behavior in
Organizations , Prentice Hail, 1966,
79

18. Archibald, K.A., " Three Views of the Expert's rcle in
Policymaking" , Policy Sciences Maqazine^ v. 1, p.
73-36, 1970.




20. Direccicn Nacional del Presupuesto, Rasumen de la Lay.
de Presu£uesto, Hinisterio de HacienHa ,~"T9*o2-79 7£,
21. Oficina de Presupuesto, P£2X^ c i°- ^ -^ Le -¥ de££§su£uesto, Ministerio de la DerensaT 1962-1 97S,
22. Novick
<
D., Wich Program Do We Mean in Program





Defense Documentation Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
Department Chairman, Code 72 1
Department of Operations Research
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
LCDR James D. Buttinger, Code 54Bk 2
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
Prof. Michael G. Sovereign, Cede 55Zo 1
Department of Operations Research
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
Prof. Carl R. Jones, Code 54Js 1




7. Direccion de Presupuesto y Prog. Economica
Comandancia General de la Marina
Caracas, Venezuela 101
8. LCDR Manuel Suarez
Dirsccicn de Personal
Comandancia General de la Marina
Caracas, Venezuela 101
9. LCDR Henry Cedillo Diaz
Direccicn de Personal






























An analysis of the Venezuelan DoD budget
3 2768 001 02843 4
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
